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Executive summary
The slow-down in productivity and income over the past decade has weakened the Euro-
pean Union’s output legitimacy, which is grounded in delivering prosperity to its citizens. At 
the same time, decreasing growth reduces the capacity of governments to maintain existing 
levels of welfare protection and translates into a perception of rising unfairness and inequality 
across and within EU countries. 
It is estimated that remaining non-tariff obstacles, in particular in services sectors, limit 
intra-EU trade to a level about four times smaller than the intensity of trade between US 
states. By completing the single market, the EU could generate significant income gains. How-
ever the more straightforward steps have already been taken, so the single market agenda 
now touches upon specific domestic regulations in EU countries. 
We recommend a two-pillar strategy: for sectors with large externalities and/or economies 
of scale (such as energy or telecoms), regulations should be harmonised and at least close 
coordination between regulators should be achieved; for other services sectors, the efficien-
cy of individual regulations on a cost-benefit basis with respect to their objective should be 
assessed, with systematic benchmarking. 
We also recommend pursuing a credible environmental policy agenda on a destination 
basis (impacting both EU and non-EU firms) rather than on an origin basis (which is the case 
today), through a combination of ambitious technical standards, a reference path for the car-
bon price and revenue-neutral tax instruments. This would stimulate long-term investment in 
the energy transition without overly hurting EU firms’ competitiveness.
To further stimulate investment, especially in innovative sectors, we suggest moving 
ahead decisively with the capital markets union agenda. In parallel, the use of EU funds 
should be reviewed taking into account the objectives of economic convergence, spillovers 
between member states and solidarity.  
EU national governments are responsible for welfare-related redistribution. However 
EU policies can help by empowering member countries to address the possible effects of EU 
integration, or by developing EU-wide instruments to limit its impact on possible losers. We 
argue that tax and social security avoidance or fraud need to be combatted with modern tools, 
eg a single electronic interface to monitor the payment of social charges of posted workers in 
their home countries. In order to fight corporate tax avoidance and improve tax fairness, the 
interest and royalties directive could be modified if the project of a common, consolidated 
corporate tax base (CCCTB) proves too difficult to agree. 
Finally, we recommend making social security systems more neutral with respect to 
intra-EU migration, eg by introducing the full continuation of home-country unemployment 
rights for migrant jobseekers, with closer cooperation between national employment services, 
and by centralising information on pension entitlements on a single platform.
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1. Introduction
The European project has reached a critical juncture after the United Kingdom’s vote in favour 
of leaving the European Union, with the potential consequence of leaving the single market as 
well. In such a situation, the EU needs more than ever to demonstrate the concrete benefits it 
brings to its citizens. In this respect, two factors are critical.
The first is the significant decline in productivity growth in the EU, which is the conse-
quence of three layers of deceleration: (i) the deceleration of the world economy (including 
the United States) and the associated concern about secular stagnation1; (ii) the deceleration 
of EU productivity growth relative to the United States and Japan; and (iii) the weakness of 
some EU countries such as Italy (Figure 1).
Figure 1: TFP growth in selected countries, percent per year
Source: Ameco.
The second factor is the increasing perception of unfairness. There are different ways of 
measuring inequality, sometimes delivering different messages. All measures show that, 
despite rising inequality in several EU countries over the last decades and more specifically 
since the crisis, the EU is by far the least unequal world region (Darvas and Wolff, 2016). 
However some EU countries (such as France and southern European countries) suffer from 
high unemployment (especially youth unemployment). In some other EU countries (such as 
Germany, Austria or the Czech Republic), the rate of unemployment is low but social mobil-
ity is relatively limited2. In all countries except those of Scandinavia, perceived and actual 
income distributions differ widely: perceived inequality is much larger than actual inequality 
(Niehues, 2014). These different elements, combined with the perception that bankers largely 
escaped personal sanctions after the financial crisis, and that some multinationals largely 
avoid taxation, feed a sentiment of unfairness whatever the hard data on Gini coefficients has 
to say. Whether caused by European integration or by technological change, the geographic 
redistribution of wealth also contributes to a feeling of inequality.
The two factors – lack of growth and unfairness – reinforce each other to the extent that 
lower growth reduces the capacity of national governments to maintain the welfare state. 
Both growth and fairness are critical for the functioning and perhaps even the survival of the 
EU. A slow-down in productivity and growth undermines the legitimacy of the EU, which has 
always relied on the commitment to deliver prosperity to citizens, ie on ‘output legitimacy’.
1 See, for example Teulings and Baldwin (2014).
2 See OECD, Education at a Glance 2014, which finds that upward mobility, defined as the percentage of 25-64 year 
old non-students whose educational attainment is higher than that of their parents, is lower in these three coun-
tries than in the United States.
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Inequality is often perceived to be a consequence of economic integration. Based on an 
extensive database on party positions and voting behaviour at district level in western Europe 
from the late 1980s to 2008, Colatone and Stanig (2016) show that voters exposed to compe-
tition from China are more likely to vote for candidates with protectionist and nationalistic 
platforms. Although European integration involves countries with more similar development 
levels, it also involves winners and losers, with the subsequent risk of the rejection of the 
whole process. Additionally, the EU is responsible for trade agreements with third countries 
or regions, so discontent with globalisation will likely generate a backlash against the EU.
The rationale for the single market is that market integration will boost welfare, stimu-
late growth and increase European competitiveness. However, quantifying these effects is 
methodologically complex. Mariniello et al (2015) concluded that the impact so far has fallen 
short of initial expectations, because: (1) barriers continue to prevail in the EU, preventing the 
exploitation of the potential benefits of full market integration; (2) ‘complementary policies’ 
to support the single market have not been put in place, or have been insufficient; (3) the 
single market project has not sufficiently been framed as a key part of the process of creative 
destruction that Europe needs to embrace to successfully modernise its economy3.
Progress with further integration might also be slow because of the fear of a populist back-
lash against deeper integration and the possible effects of deeper integration on inequality. It 
is mostly the responsibility of national governments to share the gains among all citizens and 
to help those that lose out to move into new jobs. However, since the winners are typically 
mobile, they are able to partly escape redistributive taxation. Reciprocally, losers may move 
to more prosperous countries. More importantly, national politicians might find it politically 
rewarding to attribute rising inequality to European integration. The EU should thus not dis-
regard this aspect of market integration.  
We believe that the EU should pursue its strategy to complete the single market by 
reducing cross-border impediments to the development of new activities (such as the digital 
sector) and by incentivising national governments to cut entry barriers and bureaucratic 
costs. In parallel, the EU should enhance investment in the EU and progressively re-focus 
the EU budget on those projects with sizeable externalities across member states. Finally, 
while respecting that national governments are responsible for social policy and influencing 
income distribution, the EU should develop the internal market in a way that does not under-
mine the ability of countries to act against tax and social insurance avoidance or evasion. 
This three-pillar strategy would raise the prospects of a resumption of growth in the EU, while 
addressing concerns about the unequal distribution of its proceeds.
2 How to boost productivity growth in the 
European Union
2.1 The single market: a glass half full
The contribution of European integration to growth is difficult to measure because of reverse 
causality (there is more impetus for integration in a period of growth and convergence) and 
the difficulty of constructing a credible counter-factual. Few scholars have even tried to 
measure the effect of European integration on growth, contrasting with numerous studies 
focused on trade (Sapir, 2011). Applying the synthetic counterfactuals method to various EU 
enlargements, Campos et al (2014) find that “per capita European incomes in the absence of 
the economic and political integration process would have been on average 12 per cent lower 
3  See also Monti (2010).
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today, with substantial variations across countries, enlargements as well as over time”. This 
average figure is within the range found in the limited and fragile literature on this issue (5 to 
20 percent, depending on the study). 
European integration has led to a decline in trade costs across EU countries and a subse-
quent increase in intra-EU competition, and the impact of EU integration is generally found 
to outstrip that seen in free trade areas4. Still, trade between European countries is estimated 
to be about four times less than between US states once the influence of language and other 
factors like distance and population have been corrected for5. For goods, non-tariff obstacles 
to trade are estimated to be around 45 percent of the value of trade on average, and for ser-
vices, the order of magnitude is even higher6. If the intensity of trade between member states 
could be doubled from a factor of 1/4 to a factor of 1/2 in order to narrow the gap with US 
states, it could translate into an average 14 percent higher income for Europeans (Aussilloux  
et al, 2011). The question then is how to achieve this ambitious objective.
2.2 A renewed, two-sided approach to the single market
The extensive literature on how the single market could be deepened generally concludes 
that the easy gains have already been secured. The remaining barriers to trade are now in the 
services sectors and are much more difficult to eliminate, since services are and should be 
regulated: health care, legal services or data-intensive industries all need proper regulation. 
Since discrimination between nationals and non-nationals has already largely been elimi-
nated, the challenge now is to harmonise regulations so that companies can develop their 
activities across borders in the same smooth way as they do within a country. Depending on 
the sector, two different approaches could be taken.
a. Exploiting EU-wide economies of scale
Despite much talk and some relative successes – for example in the air transport sector – 
many of the most prominent services sectors remain fragmented. This is the case in the 
energy sector, rail transport, telecoms, consumer insurance markets, banking and profes-
sional services, among others. Although the big players in each of these sectors have activities 
in several EU countries, they operate not as if there was one single market, but on a series of 
distinct national markets. 
The very slow progress in the pan-European integration of these sectors over the last 20 
years suggests that a new approach is needed. For sectors with strong cross-border externali-
ties and/or the potential for large economies of scale7, the EU could define a single rule book 
and establish a single regulator or a network of national regulators, similarly to competition 
authorities. In networks, the national regulators would abide by the same rules, the same 
principles and methods, and by the same jurisprudence under the supervision and the coor-
dination of a European regulator. This would be compatible with different national policies in 
certain areas, such as the choice of different energy mixes.
Creating larger and more integrated markets is particularly important in the digital sector. 
Europe cannot afford to miss out on the next steps in the digital revolution, which is starting 
to reshuffle the cards in many industrial sectors, such as the car industry, and services sectors. 
The EU risks falling behind global competitors and losing the most profitable segments of the 
value chain to digital newcomers from other continents.
Recommendation 1: In sectors with large externalities and potential economies of scale, 
the single market agenda should aim at a single rulebook and close coordination (or 
merger) of national regulators.
4 See Méjean and Schwellnus (2009) and Sapir (2011). 
5 Head and Mayer (2002). The corresponding ratio was 6 in the late 1970s; see Fontagné et al (2005).
6 Aussilloux and Emlinger (2011) and Fontagné et al (2011).
7 Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry (2014) call them “borderless sectors”. 
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The fast development of US digital champions is especially challenging for the EU since 
the sector is very much of a ‘winner-takes-all’ type and companies operating in the US benefit 
from a large and integrated market. In contrast, digital companies in the EU suffer from 
market fragmentation, limitations and insecurity relating to the use and exchange of data, and 
limited availability of venture capital, among other factors (Colin et al, 2015). A new EU reg-
ulation on protection of personal data will take effect in May 2018 with the objective of mod-
ernising and strengthening the EU legal framework8. However, it will not provide full clarity 
for companies on questions regarding safe exchanges of data between them across borders9. 
For that to happen, more precise guidelines would be needed to increase legal certainty, in 
particular regarding treatment by national data privacy regulators. 
In 2014, the EU adopted a regulation for the mutual recognition of electronic identification 
for secure transactions between businesses, citizens and public authorities that will apply 
from mid-201810. In the same vein, the EU could promote EU-wide digital IDs for connection 
to digital platforms that respect the privacy of consumers and offer an alternative to commer-
cial, lock-in connection tools such as Facebook Connect.
As digital markets are changing fast and encompassing multiple aspects, there is a case 
for a upstream regulation in order to ensure fair competition, through the establishment 
of a single EU regulator and a single EU rule book. The single EU regulator would develop 
principles for algorithm governance, support fair taxation of digital players and promote fair 
conditions of competition in the world of mobile apps11.
Access to public data (on transportation, meteorology, job vacancies, etc) is also a key 
issue for the development of innovative services and productivity growth in the public sector. 
The 2003 directive (2003/98/EC, revised in 2013 as 2013/37/EU) on re-use of public data set 
the general principle of openness and regulate pricing conditions. Harmonising national 
practices in terms of which public data sets are open and under which format would help 
start-ups to emerge and grow faster Europe-wide.
b. Fostering competition through administrative simplification
In other services sectors, overly cumbersome national administrative procedures and reg-
ulations are seen by businesses as the main impediment to their development on other EU 
markets. A large administrative burden can be viewed as a fixed cost that weighs more on 
small and medium-sized companies (especially foreign ones), and thus favours incumbents 
at the expense of new, innovative firms. This burden represents the main obstacle to a truly 
single market, as formal discrimination has been eliminated. Recent progress has been made, 
for example, with the European legislative package on public contracts: bidders will now only 
have to fill in the European Single Procurement Document online, while proof of accuracy 
will only be requested from selected firms. However, many national administrative proce-
dures and regulations remain cumbersome. For instance, it takes an average of 218 hours per 
year for German companies to pay their taxes (137 in France)12. Cross-border procedures are 
especially cumbersome, for instance in relation to legal proceedings, which is a major imped-
iment to the completion of the single market. 
Although they are no longer openly discriminatory against entities from other EU coun-
tries, there are still about 3000 national regulatory requirements that apply to professional 
and business services, including requirements relating to shareholding, specific legal forms 
8 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 27 April 2016.
9 This could be resolved by European Commission’s free-flow-of-data initiative.
10 Regulation No 910/2014 of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in 
the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
11 Apps rely on a very limited set of operating systems and platforms. These compulsory data gates tend to reinforce 
the monopolistic features of the market.
12 See PriceWaterhouseCoopers/World Bank (2016), Paying Taxes.
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and restrictions on prices or multidisciplinary activities13. EU countries should now go a step 
further and cross-check the performance of these regulations against the public goals they are 
supposed to pursue (such as public health or safety). This could lead to the identification of 
overly cumbersome and discriminatory domestic regulations, opening the way for simplifica-
tion.
In order to accelerate the process and focus on the most relevant areas, a committee of 
companies from various EU countries could be set up in order to benchmark the different 
countries on precise areas and foster competition by publicising their rankings. Key areas 
to be scrutinised could include property registration, dealing with construction permits, 
accountancy reporting, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing down a 
business. Special attention would be paid to regulations that do not seem to perform well 
in achieving the public goals they are supposed to achieve, or which involve higher costs 
in comparison to the best-performing countries. National regulators could commission 
independent evaluations in this regard and cross-check the results with their European 
counterparts14.
Recommendation 2: In services sectors, individual regulations should be systematically 
assessed on a cost-benefit basis, with reference to the best practices, in order to reduce 
undue obstacles to cross-border activity. 
2.3 Towards a destination-based environmental policy
It is no longer possible to discuss growth-enhancing policies without accounting for environ-
mental constraints that will affect productivity either directly (eg in agriculture) or indirectly, 
through cost-inflating policies such as carbon taxes. In order to maintain the global temper-
ature below 2 degrees Celsius, advanced economies including the EU should reach net zero 
emissions by 2050 (Auverlot and Beeker, 2016). However, imposing heavy taxes or emission 
permit restrictions on EU companies is hardly sustainable without a credible international 
agreement that covers the most polluting countries. In the context of uncertainties around the 
future of the United Nations Paris Agreement, the EU should think how to develop an ambi-
tious environmental strategy without hurting its own competitiveness too much.
A first avenue is to more systematically redistribute the proceeds of carbon taxation to the 
polluters themselves in a way that preserves price-driven incentives but without undermin-
ing competitiveness. For instance, a carbon tax on passenger and merchandise transporta-
tion could be imposed, and the proceeds redistributed proportionally per passenger-km or 
ton-km. Such a quid-pro-quo would give the transportation sector an incentive to invest in 
low-carbon vehicles without reducing their overall profitability even in the short term15. To 
the extent that all transport modes are treated the same way, it may also trigger reduced travel 
and a shift towards less polluting modes (eg rail rather than trucks).
A second approach would be to set ambitious technical standards in a number of key 
areas with relatively long but credible horizons. Of course, from an economic point of view, 
price penalties on the externality are preferable to standards because of rebound effects 
and costly overinvestment. But in some instances, technical standards might be more easily 
agreed because they contribute to the meeting of societal goals. For example, the EU could 
set a regulation only allowing very low or zero-emission cars to be sold in or imported into 
the EU by 2035. Setting the deadline more than 15 years ahead would give the car industry an 
13 Restrictions on multidisciplinary activities prevent a company from providing to its clients several types of servic-
es, for example architecture, construction and real-estate services.
14 The European Commission’s proposals published on 10 January 2017 rely on a similar logic. See ‘A services econo-
my that works for Europeans’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-23_en.htm.
15 One further advantage would be to make such taxation acceptable not only to national companies, but also to 
foreign suppliers. See Bureau et al (2017).
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incentive to invest in clean vehicles while allowing enough time for them and their employees 
to adapt, without creating a competitive disadvantage for European carmakers since the same 
standard would apply to foreign models. EU manufacturers could even reap a competitive 
advantage once other countries eventually introduce similar standards16. 
A third, complementary approach would be to reduce uncertainty around future carbon 
prices in order to stimulate long-term investment in low emission manufacturing17. Currently, 
explicit or implicit carbon prices vary widely in different sectors and countries. Many private 
companies and public bodies base their investment decisions on their own reference value 
for carbon, generally much higher than current and foreseeable EU emissions trading system 
(ETS) prices, while technical standards yield also their own implicit prices and carbon taxes 
vary in different EU countries. Defining a trajectory for the price of carbon as a reference 
value compatible with the EU’s emission commitments would foster consistency of private 
and public decisions, even though full consistency between ETS prices, carbon taxes and 
technical standards is probably beyond what can reasonably be achieved. Following the 
example of the Stiglitz-Stern High-Level Economic Commission launched by the Carbon 
Pricing Leadership Coalition during the 2016 United Nations climate summit in Marrakesh 
(COP22), the EU should task a group of experts with defining a carbon price trajectory in line 
with the EU’s commitments under the Paris Agreement. Based on this expertise, a price path 
would be adopted by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, with an appropriate 
commitment device (CIRED, 2015).
Combining the first two approaches would amount to switching from an origin-based 
environmental policy (under which EU polluters pay for EU emissions, whether the goods 
and services produced are sold in the EU or on the global market) towards a destina-
tion-based policy (under which any polluter has to pay when the goods and services are 
directed to the EU market). The third approach – an upward convergence of carbon prices 
within the EU – raises the question of fair competition between EU and non-EU producers 
of goods that might incorporate different carbon contents arising from different production 
processes. This issue will need to be solved through a cooperative approach at international 
level (Bureau et al, 2017). 
Recommendation 3: Make EU environmental policy destination- rather than origin-
based through the setting of technical standards over long but credible horizons, defining 
a reference path for the carbon price, and using revenue-neutral tax instruments to 
discourage greenhouse gas emissions.
3 A new investment agenda
Since 2007, aggregate investment in the EU has declined by over 4 percent of GDP (Figure 2). 
At the height of the crisis, the fall went hand in hand with reduced savings. Since 2012, how-
ever, savings and investments have diverged. This shows that the EU as a whole has ample 
resources to invest, but the investment takes place increasingly outside the EU. Beyond the 
single market agenda and reforms at national level, the EU needs to stimulate investment.
16 In the same vein, the EU could set the rule that by 2030 all products sold or imported in the single market should 
either be recyclable or biodegradable (the deadline might be adapted by sector and few exceptions might be 
drawn based on expert panel recommendation).
17 Annual additional investment needed in relation to the Paris Agreement is estimated to be around €38 billion (or 
approximately 0.36 percent of euro area’s GDP) over the period 2011 to 2030; see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_MEMO-14-40_en.htm. Without clear price signals, investment is likely to remain subdued however. See 
Eyraud et al (2011).
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Figure 2: Saving and investment in the EU28 (% of EU GDP)
Source: IMF, WEO Oct. 2016.
3.1 Making progress with capital markets union
Renewed efforts to complete the single market would stimulate private investment in the EU 
by creating new opportunities and increasing returns. A key condition is adequate financing, 
notably through equity, which fits more the needs of new business models, whereas the Euro-
pean economy still relies mostly on bank lending.
More generally, a diverse capital market (ie relying both on bank and market finance) 
has been shown to enhance growth and strengthen financial stability (Langfield and Pagano, 
2015). The EU has not only a strong bias towards bank-based financial intermediation but 
is also characterised by low cross-border integration in certain segments of capital markets. 
Hence the single market agenda on capital markets, the so-called Capital Markets Union, 
is an important project. However, it touches on a multifaceted policy agenda that includes 
accounting, corporate governance, insolvency regulations and also more simple issues such 
as the prospectus directive (Véron and Wolff, 2016). Capital markets union also concerns ven-
ture capital, which is far less developed in the EU than in the US or even China18. In November 
2016, the Commission published a proposal on business restructuring and insolvency19. Work 
on these technical issues is key to enable capital to flow smoothly across the EU to provide 
finance, in particular, for SMEs.
Completing the banking union is also important for the integration of EU financial 
markets, especially in the euro area. Bank ‘de-nationalisation’ (by reducing the weight of the 
national public sector on both the asset and the liability sides) is a precondition for develop-
ing a cross-border banking sector in which credit is less dependent on the fiscal and mac-
roeconomic situation in each member state. This is especially important because SMEs will 
remain heavily dependent on bank lending in the EU.
Recommendation 4: Continue to address the different structural challenges related 
to the capital markets agenda, especially in the area of corporate insolvency law, by 
moving to identical core principles across the single market. 
18 EY Global Venture Capital Trend, 2015.
19 European Commission (2016) ‘Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance 
and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending 
Directive 2012/30/EU’, COM(2016) 723 final, 22 November. 
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3.2 Mobilising EU resources
The Juncker plan introduced in 2014 (European Fund for Strategic Investments, EFSI) aims 
to fill the investment gap in the EU by stimulating investment in relatively risky projects 
that could not be financed without some form of public guarantee. According to European 
Investment Bank figures, by 23 September 2016, total investment arising from approved EFSI 
projects reached €127.2 billion (for 324 approved projects), representing roughly 4 percent of 
total investment in the EU between April 2015 and March 2016. Although total investment in 
the EU had increased by €139.5 billion compared to one year before, it is too early to conclude 
that the Juncker plan really triggered investment projects that otherwise would not have been 
financed20. More importantly, the Juncker plan raises the question of its interaction with the 
EU budget and the EU’s general investment strategy. 
Three justifications can be given for investment spending based (partly) on EU resources:
• Economic convergence between EU countries (and more precisely, between EU regions). 
Convergence is the remit of the Structural and Cohesion Funds21.
• Existence of spillovers between member states. Initially, food security was considered 
a common objective of the EU with strong spillovers (given the free mobility of food 
products), which justified the Common Agricultural Policy. More recently, an active R&D 
policy has been promoted at EU level. Joint investments in security and borders are also 
justified on those grounds. 
• Solidarity  which is a key founding principle of the EU. This less-defined category is ulti-
mately decided unanimously by national governments. For instance, high and persistent 
youth unemployment in a country could weaken social cohesion to such an extent that EU 
integration itself is at stake, hence becoming ‘systemic’ and justifying the introduction of 
the Youth Guarantee in 2013. Similar arguments could be made for the costs of the refugee 
crisis: although Germany and Sweden are perfectly capable of meeting the costs of large 
refugee inflows, EU countries could choose to share the cost for reasons of solidarity.
The balance between these three objectives, and the content of each, may evolve over 
time. For instance, structural funds may progressively move towards financing institution 
building (such as more efficient legal systems) or human capital (eg teacher training). As 
for spillovers, it might be argued that food safety today is more and more an issue of sani-
tary and environmental standards, which might not necessarily involve EU-level subsidies. 
Conversely, spillovers in energy, climate change policies or tertiary education have become 
more prominent. Beyond, the cohesion policy reform of 2014, the EU budget should gradually 
redirect more resources away from agriculture to meet these challenges. It should also use 
more often calls for tender to allocate financial resources where they can be of best use. 
An EU spending review should be carried out based on an independent audit of the 
quality of the main expenses and their additionality22. Other examples are large parts of the 
spending under the Common Agricultural Policy and spending on regional and structural 
policies in member states such as France and Germany23. 
20 In fact, there is still no evaluation that can convincingly prove the additionality of EFSI. Some preliminary evidence 
suggests caution but also calls for more detailed data to make such an assessment. See Claeys and Leandro (2016).
21  Merler (2016) shows with a novel identification strategy that Structural Funds have helped with economic conver-
gence in particular in the poorer periphery countries, even during the crisis.
22  Our views tend to converge with the Sapir Report (2003) An agenda for a growing Europe, the recommendations of 
which have not been fully implemented.
23  For instance, in recent years the EU provided financial support to the transformation of a public baths into offices 
in the German city of Pforzheim, the renovation of a market square and the creation of neighbourhood centres in 
Dortmund and Berlin, the transformation of brownfield sites in Nuremberg and the renovation of water tanks in 
Brandenburg. These projects may be useful, but EU involvement has no justification in these cases. It generates 
negative value added because it only adds bureaucracy.
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Conversely, the growing mobility of skilled workers within the EU increases the need for 
coordination of national policies or even some EU-level funding24. Such mobility is more 
marked the higher the level of tertiary diploma and individual reputation. In countries 
where public budgets heavily support tertiary education, rising mobility risks inducing less 
investment in human capital. One response could be to privatise this investment by making 
students paying the full price of their education. But then the risk again is under-investment, 
not to mention inequality. The alternative is more cooperation on tertiary education. Such 
cooperation could take the form of a programme for European universities and colleges, 
which would bid to receive EU extra money based on a set of excellence criteria. Large-scale 
consortia of universities of excellence would compete for the title of ‘European university’. 
World class but smaller units would compete for the ‘European college’ title25. 
Along the same lines, the EU could promote genuine recognition of skills, at least in those 
professions with a shortage of skilled people, for instance through a system of student loans 
and/or grants associated with EU certification of the degree received26.
Recommendation 5: Review the EU budget and Juncker plan in respect of economic 
convergence, spillovers between member states and solidarity. 
4 The roles of the EU and EU countries in 
promoting fairness
EU policies and in particular further initiatives to deepen the single market can directly 
increase inequality or at least the perception of inequality. There are two possible approaches 
to deal with this. EU countries themselves could reinforce their efforts to address the possible 
negative implications of integration in terms of inequality, as most policy tools are currently 
in their hands. The role of the EU would then be to empower member states to fight inequality 
for instance by protecting the member states’ tax bases but also possibly by setting regulatory 
minimum standards to prevent social dumping. 
However, the EU itself might develop instruments to limit the negative consequences of 
EU integration for possible losers. The European Social Fund and the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund have already been created for that purpose. In this section, we rather focus 
on the role the EU can play to help member states better distribute the gains arising from eco-
nomic integration. The general idea is that more coordination in the area of social protection 
and taxation is an indispensable complement to further integration of the European market.
3.1 Protecting national tax bases and improving social conditions in the 
single market
There has been a new focus since the 2008 crisis on fighting tax avoidance and tax fraud, 
notably through G20, OECD and EU initiatives. The different areas of tax avoidance and 
tax evasion delineated in Box 1 raise a number of policy issues. The first is the widespread 
perception of unfair taxation, with different treatment for rich and poor households, large 
and small firms and compliant and non-compliant agents. The second is the efficiency loss 
(hence lower growth) caused by tax distortions related to tax avoidance and evasion. The third 
24  See Garcia-Penalosa and Wasmer (2016). 
25  For proposals in the same vein, see Aghion et al (2008).
26  Despite the 2005 Directive on skill recognition (revised in 2014), local traditions of very specific education and 
training systems make skill recognition a dream far from reality for a number of medium-skilled professions.
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is a potential erosion of the tax base that might limit the ability of the state to finance public 
services or social transfers. Although they overlap, the three challenges are not equivalent. 
For instance, tax avoidance by multinationals has a disproportionate impact on perceptions, 
compared to its contribution to the overall tax gap. In practice, small businesses as a whole 
also contribute significantly to the tax gap through VAT and social fraud. 
Box 1: Some tax and social contribution avoidance landmarks
In the debate on tax avoidance and evasion, the focus is on four main areas. Firstly, accord-
ing to Zucman (2014), offshore wealth increased between 2008 and 2013 by about 28 percent 
globally. This is partly due to valuation effects, and part of the related income is declared by 
the beneficiaries to their respective tax administrations. However, Zucman estimates that 
more than 60 percent of foreign-owned deposits in Switzerland ‘belong’ to the British Virgin 
Islands, Jersey and Panama and largely escape residence-based taxation in the country of 
the ultimate beneficiary. He estimates the tax revenue loss to be close to $200 billion glob-
ally, and $75 billion in Europe. 
The second focus area is avoidance of corporation tax. Many companies use complex cor-
porate structures involving tax havens and special tax regimes (such as the ‘double Irish with 
a Dutch sandwich’ technique, or intellectual property boxes). This is not always done with the 
objective of avoiding taxes. But there is ample empirical evidence that multinational compa-
nies organise their legal and financial structures with a view to reducing their tax bill (Fuest et 
al, 2013). These tax avoidance activities are usually perfectly legal, and many countries active-
ly create loopholes for multinational companies with the aim of attracting tax revenue from 
other countries. From the perspective of the EU as a whole, though, this form of corporate tax 
avoidance is undesirable because it is a zero-sum game. 
Third, the avoidance of personal and corporate taxes remain small compared to the ‘VAT 
gap’ (ie the difference between effective and expected VAT receipts), which is estimated to 
have been close to €160 billion in 2014 for the EU as a whole, partly related to cross-border 
schemes (carousel fraud), and with significant differences between EU countries27.
Fourth, social security optimisation, avoidance and fraud are highly contentious and 
complex issues in the debate on posted workers. A 2016 report for the European Commission 
highlighted the impact of the level and the structure of social contribution systems on the 
intensity of social competition and fraud. However, though loopholes remain in EU welfare 
rules, a report commissioned by the European Commission in 2013 concluded that ‘welfare 
shopping’ claims are not supported by data, and are rather an issue of perception (Juravle et 
al, 2013).
It is not our purpose to discuss in detail the different strategies to reduce tax avoidance. 
We would rather link this discussion with the single market agenda by noting that rising 
mobility (of goods, services, capital and labour) across the EU should go hand-in-hand 
with greater capabilities of national tax and social administrations to identify cross-border 
avoidance. The key issue here is that of cross-border information systems, which are lagging 
behind. Bold action needs to be taken in this area.
A first step is the under-construction Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS), 
which aims to connect national commercial and company registers by 8 June 2017. The BRIS 
will take the form of a portal through which a company or a tax administration from an EU 
country will be able to retrieve relevant information from a foreign company or branch, based 
27  See European Commission, Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2016 Final Report, Sep-
tember 2016. The VAT gap is partly due to bankruptcies, financial insolvencies, but fraud, evasion and avoidance 
are also part of the picture.
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on a single identification number28. The BRIS will reduce information asymmetry between 
national and cross-border activities. For instance, it will allow an SME in Germany to check 
the basic legal and financial situation of a potential supplier in Italy (including possible ongo-
ing legal procedures). The system will also give national tax administrations greater scope to 
assess the risk related to individual companies, in terms of avoidance or fraud29.
A second issue is posted workers, whose total numbers, although still limited in propor-
tion to host labour markets, have been growing rapidly in recent years30. The Commission 
proposal of 8 March 2016 to revise the Posting of Workers Directive focuses on the need to 
ensure a level playing field between posted and local workers. However, the main problem 
may be less in the design of the rules than in their implementation. According to Chevreux 
and Mathieu (2016), the labour cost for a French worker at the minimum wage is actually 
lower than that of a posted worker from Spain or Poland. The worry is that posted workers 
might not be declared, or they might be wrongly declared in terms of skills or hours worked, 
leading to artificially low social charges (Cytermann, 2014). The technology for declaring 
posted workers – the A1 form – is from the twentieth century: each posted worker is supposed 
to carry a paper copy with him/her; if it cannot be shown during a check, the administration 
of origin is required to provide the form, with sometimes long delays. Starting in July 2019, 
the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) will smooth the exchange of 
information between social security administrations. However, the exchange will still rely on 
voluntary cooperation and action, and the recovery of social security contributions or social 
transfers will remain difficult. A modern system based on electronic data and single identifi-
cation numbers could be designed in a way to reduce fraudulent practices and could thereby 
address the main factual concern relating posted workers, especially if the burden of proof is 
shifted to the company that, in case of irregularity, would be asked to pay the social contribu-
tions in the destination country.
Recommendation 6: Make sure social charges for posted workers are effectively paid in 
the home country by developing proper electronic interfaces, and make the company in 
the destination country liable for showing prior authorisation.
4.2 Corporate tax avoidance and tax coordination 
Taxation in general and dealing with tax avoidance are member state responsibilities, not 
responsibilities of the EU. However uncoordinated national tax policies can create obstacles 
to cross-border economic activity in the European internal market, making some tax coordi-
nation necessary. 
In October 2016, the European Commission relaunched its initiative from 2011 to intro-
duce a common consolidated corporate income tax base (CCCTB) in the EU. The scheme will 
be compulsory for EU groups with annual sales exceeding €750 million, and will be offered as 
an option for smaller groups. Participating companies would see the taxable profits of their 
different affiliates in the EU (and of their parents) calculated according to the same rules and 
consolidated across countries. The taxes due would then be allocated to the different member 
28  See EU Directive 2012/17/EU on the interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers, 13 June 
2012.
29  Along similar lines, the Commission is preparing a legislative proposal to introduce a single taxpayer identification 
number for European households. This number would simplify registration procedures and access to social trans-
fers when moving across the EU. It would also make it easier for tax administrations to communicate and identify 
tax avoidance or fraud, through the operation of the automatic exchange of information. See also the European 
Parliament report on the Anti-Avoidance Directive (27 May 2016). 
30  +45 percent since 2010, and approximately 1.9 million, or 0.7 percent of the total EU workforce in 2014. See Pacolet 
and Wispelaere (2015). The latest figure for France would be a ‘stock’ of posted worker of 286,025 in 2015, or 
about 1 percent of total employment. The count of posted workers however relies on the A1 forms and may not be 
exhaustive. See CLEISS (2016), and Voss and Maack (2016).
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states according to a formula depending on the location of assets, employees (and wage bill) 
and sales.
The new CCCTB blueprint proposes as a first step to start with the introduction of a 
common tax base without consolidation. The main advantage of this first step is that it will 
reduce the tax compliance costs associated with dealing with 28 different regimes; these costs 
have been shown to be substantial, especially for SMEs31. CCCTB will also reduce certain 
forms of tax avoidance that rely on the different treatment of the same flows in different 
member states. However, by making the effective tax rates in different EU countries more 
transparent, this first step will likely intensify competition to attract investment. 
Once consolidation has been introduced, standard forms of profit shifting – eg through 
intra-group pricing or lending – will no longer be possible. However, new forms of profit shift-
ing will be made possible, depending eg on the rules that might be introduced on the location 
of ‘permanent establishments’, and on how corporate groups are structured (Fuest, 2008).   
Therefore, CCCTB should be encouraged essentially on efficiency grounds, because it will 
simplify corporate tax systems, reduce compliance costs and reduce cross-border barriers to 
activity. Although it will likely reduce tax avoidance, it will not eliminate it. The implemen-
tation of CCCTB will be complex because member states need to agree on a common set of 
rules, which will not be easy.   
Another approach could be to re-consider the Interest and Royalties Directive32, which 
currently limits the right of member states to levy source taxes on interest and royalty pay-
ments that companies transfer between them. An unintended side effect of this directive is 
that royalties charged to subsidiaries operating in high-tax EU countries reduce the taxable 
profits in those countries, without necessarily being taxed in any other EU country. This is 
because some EU countries do not tax royalties that are channelled towards non-EU coun-
tries, even when the latter are tax havens. If royalties paid to EU member states and royalties 
paid to third countries were both taxed at source, widely used tax-planning strategies based 
on the location of intellectual property in tax havens would become ineffective. Of course, 
allowing for more source taxes would require these taxes to be credited in the countries where 
they are received. Since this would lead to a redistribution of tax revenues between countries, 
it might be difficult to agree on such a reform. Alternatively, member states could coordinate 
their double taxation agreements with third countries and their rules defining tax residence, 
making sure that royalties or interest paid to tax havens outside the EU do not go untaxed33.
In its recently adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the EU wants to tackle tax avoidance 
in the framework of a more general approach based on the concept of ‘artificiality’ of business 
conduct. The advantage of this approach is that it allows member states to react flexibly to dif-
ferent forms of tax avoidance. The disadvantage is that it creates considerable uncertainty for 
companies relating to the tax implications of their activities. At the same time, double taxation 
can easily arise if the actions of individual member states are not coordinated. 
Recommendation 7: Modify the Interest and Royalties Directive to allow for more 
extended use of source taxes on royalties and interest. Alternatively, coordinate double 
taxation agreements with third countries. 
31  According to the European Commission, overall tax compliance costs for companies operating in the EU would 
decline by €0.7 billion annually; see European Commission (2011), Questions and Answers on the CCCTB, Memo 
11/171, 16 March 2011.
32  Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty 
payments made between associated companies of different Member States. 
33  For more detail, see Finke et al (2014).
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4.3 Intra-EU migration
In 2014, 14.3 million Europeans lived in another EU country, against an overall EU population 
of more than 500 million. Each year about one million people change countries, 25 percent 
of whom are returning to their country of origin. The latter bring back skills that they have ac-
quired during their time in another European country, increasing the human capital of their 
home country. However, some countries in Europe experience a steep decline in their active, 
skilled populations, because of net outward migration. This can be problematic because it 
reduces the potential for growth in these countries. It might also be an issue of fairness be-
cause the investment in education financed by the country of origin might ultimately benefit 
the recipient country, even though emigrants may send significant remittances back to their 
origin countries34.
From the perspective of the destination country, immigration from other EU countries 
is commonly found to have a positive impact, even when narrowly looking at the net con-
tribution of migrants to the social security system. Migrant workers are on average younger 
and more economically active than host countries’ own populations, and therefore usually 
contribute more in taxes and social security contributions to the host country budget than 
they receive in benefits35.
Even though fraud and abuse exists, there is evidence that ‘welfare shopping’ is currently 
of limited relevance as far as intra-EU migration is concerned. First, the majority of migrants 
move to find (or take up) employment: more than 60 percent of intra-EU migrants work, and 
this proportion has increased over time. This proportion is not far from the EU28 aggregate 
employment rate, which was 70 percent for the 20-64 population in 2015. Second, 79 per-
cent of non-active EU migrants live in economically active households. Third, 64 percent of 
currently non-active migrants have worked before in the current country of residence. Fourth, 
non-active intra-EU migrants do not form a static group: a third of EU migrant jobseekers 
(32 percent) were employed one year before. And finally, intra-EU migrants are less likely to 
receive disability and unemployment benefits than natives. This suggests that the ‘welfare 
magnet effect’ is rather small or not statistically significant36. Empirical studies measuring the 
impact of social welfare generosity on the skill composition of immigrants have led to mixed 
results, although some studies do find an effect for intra-EU migration (Razin and Wahba, 
2011).
One reason for the limited effect of the welfare magnet in the case of intra-EU migration 
could be that there is no unconditional right to stay in a host country for EU citizens before 
they have reached five consecutive years of legal residence. During that period, a country 
can ask a person to leave under certain conditions if the person has no means to sustain her 
needs or has no serious prospect of finding a job37. Thus, during that period and under EU law 
a country can still act to clamp down on abuses. After five years of consecutive residence, all 
rights are the same as for nationals and a country cannot ask a person to leave (Box 2). How-
ever, though the basic principles of EU law are rather clear and simple, diverging interpreta-
tions can arise in individual cases between member states and the EU Court of Justice.
34 For example, Poles living in Germany send each year about €2 billion in remittances to Poland, amounting to 0.5 
percent of Polish GDP. This is also the proportion for Portuguese nationals living in France. Source: Eurostat (2016) 
Net workers’ remittances and compensation of employees. 
35 See Eurofound (2015) and Juravle et al (2013). In the UK case of the UK, Dustmann, and Frattini (2014) find that 
immigrants from the European Economic Area contributed £20 billion more to public finances through taxes than 
they received in benefits and public services between 2000 and 2011. The fiscal impact of overall immigration (in-
cluding from non-EEA countries) is more mixed. Countries with generous welfare states and those who attract low 
skilled migrants or refugees tend to lose fiscally from immigration, at least in the short and medium run, see OECD 
(2013) International Migration Outlook, chapter 3.
36 These figures are taken from Juravle et al (2013). See also Medgyesi and Poloskei (2014).
37 See Article 14(1) Directive 2004/38/EC and Article 14(4) lit. b Directive 2004/38/EC. Wollenschläger and Ricketts 
(2014).
From the perspective 
of the destination 
country, immigration 
from other EU 
countries is 
commonly found to 
have a positive impact
15 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚3 | 2017
The general principle governing labour mobility in the EU should be the neutrality of 
welfare systems so that job opportunities are the key driver of labour migration. The welfare 
system should thus neither encourage nor discourage labour mobility. Such neutrality does 
not exist today. For instance, a worker who has lost his/her job will receive unemployment 
benefit for different periods depending on whether he/she is looking for a job in the same 
country as the previous job or in another EU country (in the latter case, the benefit is limited 
to three months, paid by the country of the previous job, according to the ‘continuation’ prin-
ciple). Conversely, a worker who has lost his/her job in a country, moves to another country 
and works there for only a short period before becoming unemployed, can ask for an ‘aggre-
gation’ of his/her contributions and then receive unemployment benefit paid only by the last 
country visited, despite the short period worked there.
Full neutrality of unemployment insurance is probably impossible to achieve. A major 
constraint in this area is the link between the payment of unemployment benefits and the 
active job search, which needs to be closely monitored by a single job service. However, there 
are several ways of making social security more neutral. First, the ‘continuation’ principle 
could be extended to the same duration as that enjoyed while staying in the country of the 
previous job. In order to check that the jobseeker does continue to look actively for a job in 
the new country of residence, the employment service of origin would have to maintain reg-
ular contact (distance contact) with the jobseeker, or choose to delegate assistance in the job 
search process to the employment service where the person lives. Second, the aggregation of 
unemployment benefits could come along with annual transfers between national unem-
ployment services to compensate for costs arising in the different countries. For instance, a 
country with good job opportunities might attract jobseekers from other EU countries, some 
of whom could benefit from ‘aggregated’ unemployment benefits paid by the local unemploy-
ment service, and later compensated for by the different origin countries, , possibly through a 
central clearing platform.
Recommendation 8: Make unemployment insurance more neutral with respect to 
intra-EU migration through the full continuation of rights when leaving one country for 
another EU country, and through compensation payments between countries for the 
costs incurred by the application of the aggregation principle.
The Commission’s December 2016 proposal38 goes in this direction, with two building 
blocks: (i) an extension from three to six months of the minimum duration of the contin-
uation of unemployment benefits when a jobseeker moves to another EU country; (ii) a 
minimum qualification period of three months of activity in a given member state before a 
worker can ask for the aggregation of his/her entitlements39. On (i) we believe that the objec-
tive should be full continuation of the benefits, provided closer coordination can be organised 
between employment agencies. On (ii), although the minimum employment period will elim-
inate a whole category of abuse, transfer payments need to be organised between member 
states in case aggregation is more frequent in one country than in others.
As for pensions, the principle of aggregation currently applies: periods of employment 
completed in different EU countries in the course of a career are taken into account when 
calculating pension entitlements from each country. Unfortunately, the scheme does not 
cover so-called occupational pensions, except when they result from compulsory insurance 
38 European Commission (2016) ‘Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation No. 883/2004 on the coordination 
of social security systems and Regulation No. 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing regulation 
No. 883/2004’, COM(2016) 815 final, 13 December.
39 The Commission also proposes that unemployment benefits for cross-border workers be paid by the member state 
of the most recent employment, rather than by the country of residence with reimbursement by the country of 
employment.
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obligations (Garcia Peñalosa and Wasmer, 2016). More importantly, information on pensions 
is held in the different countries of residence, so it is difficult for a worker to have an idea 
of her (future) total pension before actually retiring. An EU worker should be able to access 
a European platform displaying his/her individual pension entitlements in a comprehen-
sive way (by incorporating employment periods in all EU countries), based on the different 
national pension systems that would remain separate. 
Recommendation 9: Improve information on pension entitlements by centralising 
personal information on a single platform.
Box 2: Freedom of movement for EU citizens: basic principles and implementation
EU law considers three different categories of people with regards to the freedom of move-
ment: workers, non-working citizens and jobseekers. Each category has different rights of 
residency and access to social benefits. A worker has the right to stay in the country where 
he or she works and to benefit from the same social benefits as a national. During the first 
three months in the country, however, a non-working person can be refused access to social 
benefits.
After three months and up to five years, a non-working person is entitled to stay on the 
condition that he or she has full health insurance coverage and sufficient means to meet 
his or her needs. This condition does not apply to jobseekers, though to retain their right of 
residency a jobseeker must be able to prove that he/she is actively looking for a job and has 
good chances of finding one. There is of course some degree of judgement on whether these 
two conditions are met. But the basic principle is that freedom of residency is not uncondi-
tional. A member state can ask a jobseeker who is evidently not looking for a job or has little 
chance to find one (for instance after a long period of unemployment) to leave the country. A 
member state can also refuse to give a non-working person access to the right of residency if 
he or she has no means to sustain him or herself, and might therefore place an “unreasonable 
burden” upon the welfare system. There is some divergence between certain EU countries and 
the EU Court of Justice on what this means concretely, but the UK and Austria have legally 
set up a ‘test of right to residence’ to check early on if a national of another EU country has 
sufficient resources to sustain his needs or enough of a chance to find a job. 
The different elements we have highlighted suggest that it is feasible for the EU to make 
progress on growth and fairness. In particular, the new information technologies provide an 
opportunity to revive productivity growth and to make European integration ‘fairer’ by reduc-
ing tax avoidance opportunities, and progressing towards more neutral welfare systems with 
respect to intra-EU migration. Reaping this double gain will however involve far-reaching 
institutional reforms in order to equip administrations and agencies for this new world.
17 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚3 | 2017
References
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, C. Hoxby, A. Mas-Colell and A. Sapir (2008) Higher aspirations: an agenda for 
reforming European universities, Blueprint 5, Bruegel
Aussilloux, V. and C. Emlinger (2011) ‘What Benefits from Completing the Single Market?’ La Lettre du 
CEPII N°316
Aussilloux, V., H. Guimbard, C. Emlinger and L. Fontagné (2011) ‘The economic consequences for the UK 
and the EU of completing the Single Market’, BIS Economic Paper n°11
Auverlot, D. and E. Beeker (2016) ‘2017/2027 - Climat : comment agir maintenant ?’ France Stratégie, April
Bureau, D., L. Fontagné and K. Schubert (2017) ‘Trade and climate: for a reconciliation’, Note du CAE, 
forthcoming
Campos, N.F., F. Coricelli and L. Moretti (2014) ‘Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating 
the Benefits from Membership in the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method’, 
Discussion Paper, IZA
Chevreux, M. and R. Mathieu (2016) ‘Social competition from posted workers in France: misconceptions 
and realities’, Tresor-Eco n°171
CIRED (2015) Moving the trillions, a debate on positive carbon pricing of mitigation actions, Centre 
International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement
Claeys, G. and A. Leandro (2016) ‘Assessing the Juncker plan after one year’, Bruegel Blog, 17 May
CLEISS (2016) Rapport Statistique Annuel
Colatone I. and P. Stanig (2016) ‘The Trade Origins of Nationalist Protectionism: Import Competition and 
Voting Behavior in Western Europe’, mimeo, Boconi University
Colin, A., A. Landier, P. Mohnen and A. Perrot (2015) ‘The digital economy’, Note du CAE, October
Cytermann L. (2014) ‘Le détachement des travailleurs au sein de l’Union européenne’, Éclairage II, 3e 
rapport du Haut conseil du financement de la protection sociale
Darvas, Z. and G. Wolff (2016) An anatomy of inclusive growth in Europe, Blueprint 26, Bruegel
Dustmann, C. and T. Frattini (2014) ‘The fiscal effects of immigration to the UK, Centre For Research and 
Analysis on Migration’, The Economic Journal 124: F593–F643
Enderlein, H. and J. Pisani-Ferry (2014) Reforms, investment and growth: an agenda for France, Germany 
and Europe, Report to Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron
Eurofound (2015) Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services, Publications Office of 
the European Union
Eyraud, L., A. Wane, C. Zhang and B. Clements (2011) ‘Who’s Going Green and Why? Trends and 
Determinants of Green Investment’, Working Paper 11/296, International Monetary Fund
Fuest, C., C. Spengel, K. Finke, J.H. Heckemeyer and H. Nusser (2013) ‘Profit Shifting and ‘Aggressive’ Tax 
Planning by Multinational Firms: Issues and Options for Reform’, World Tax Journal 5, 3: 307-324
Finke, K., C. Fuest, H. Nusser and C. Spengel (2014) ‘Extending taxation of interest and royalty income at 
source: an option to limit base erosion and profit shifting?’ ZEW Discussion Paper 14-073
Fontagné, L., A. Guillin and C. Mitaritonna (2011) ‘Estimations of Tariff Equivalents for the Services 
Sectors’, Working Paper N° 2011-24, CEPII
Fontagné, L., T. Mayer and S. Zignago (2005) ‘Trade in the Triad: How Easy is the Access to Large 
Markets?’ Canadian Journal of Economics 38(4): 1401-1430
Fuest, C. (2008) ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base’, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24: 720-739
Garcia-Penalosa, C. and E. Wasmer (2016) ‘Preparing France for the increasing mobility of talents’, Note 
du CAE No. 31, May
Head, K. and T. Mayer (2002) ‘Non-Europe: The Magnitude and Causes of Market Fragmentation in the 
EU’, Review of World Economics 2(136): 285-314
Juravle, C., T. Weber, E. Canetta, E. Fries Tersch and M. Kadunc (2013) A fact finding analysis on the 
impact on the Member States’ social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU 
migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, 
Report for the European Commission
Langfield S. and M. Pagano (2015) ‘Bank Bias in Europe: Effects on Systemic Risk and Growth’, Economic 
Policy, April
Mariniello, M., A. Sapir and A. Terzi (2015) ‘The long road towards the European single market’, Working 
Paper 2015/01, Bruegel
© Bruegel 2017. All rights 
reserved. Short sections, not 
to exceed two paragraphs, 
may be quoted in the original 
language without explicit 
permission provided that 
the source is acknowledged. 
Opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the 
author(s) alone.
 Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, 
B-1210 Brussels 
(+32) 2 227 4210  
info@bruegel.org  
www.bruegel.org
Medgyesi, M. and P. Poloskei (2014) ‘Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection’, Research Note 
n°10/2013, DG Employment, European Commission
Méjean, I. and C.  Schwellnus (2009) ‘Price convergence in the European Union: Within firms or 
composition of firms?’ Journal of International Economics 78(1): 1-10
Merler, S. (2016) ‘Income convergence during the crisis: did EU funds provide a buffer?’, Working Paper 
2016/06, Bruegel
Monti, M. (2010) A New Strategy for the Single Market, Report to the President of the European 
Commission, May
Niehues, G. (2014) ‘Subjective Perceptions of Inequality and Redistributive Preferences: An International 
Comparison’, Discussion Paper, Cologne Institute for Economic Research
Pacolet J. and F. de Wispelaere (2015) Posting of workers, Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2014, 
European Commission
Razin, A. and J. Wahba (2011) ‘Welfare magnet hypothesis, fiscal burden, and immigration skill selectivity’, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117(2): 369-402
Sapir, A. (2011) ‘European Integration at the Cross roads: A Review Essay on the 50th Anniversary  of  Bela 
Balassa’s  Theory  of  Economic  Integration’, Journal  of  Economic Literature 49(4): 1200–1229
Teulings, C. and R. Baldwin (eds) (2014) Secular stagnation: Facts, causes, and cures, Vox Ebook, 
September
Véron, N. and G. Wolff (2016) ‘Capital Markets Union: a Vision for the Long Term’, Journal of Financial 
Regulation 0: 1-24
Voss, E. and W. Maack (2016) Posting of Workers Directive – current situation and challenges, Report for 
the European Parliament, June
Wollenschläger, F. and J. Ricketts (2014) ‘Jobseekers’ Residence Rights and Access to Social Benefits: 
EU Law and its Implementation in the Member States’, Online Journal on Free Movement of Workers 
within the European Union, n°7, January
Zucman, G. (2014) ‘Taxing across borders: Tracking personal wealth and corporate profits’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 28 (4): 121-148
